



Older employees' declining attitudes over 20 years and across 
classes
White, M. and Smeaton, D.
 
This is a copy of the accepted author manuscript of the following article: White, M. and 
Smeaton, D. (2016) Older employees' declining attitudes over 20 years and across 
classes. Human Relations, 69 (8), pp. 1619-1641. The final definitive version is available 
from the publisher Sage at:
https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018726715618765
© The Author(s) 2016
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
1Older British employees’ declining attitudes over 20 years and across classes
Michael White and Deborah Smeaton
Abstract
British employers, under increasing competitive pressures, and applying new technology and 
work organization, have sought to reduce labor costs, resulting in work intensification and 
precarity. Older employees as a result are exposed to work demands that conflict with 
expectations of favourable treatment in late career. National survey data for Britain in the years 
1992, 2001, 2006 and 2012 demonstrate decline in overall job attitude among older employees 
following the changed conditions of the 1990s and across the major recession commencing 2008. 
To assess whether this decline is unequally distributed, a decomposition by socio-economic class 
is carried out. This shows that older employees in the ‘service class’ of managerial and 
professional employees are affected at least as much as older employees in intermediate and less-
skilled classes, thus underlining the age effect and showing that ‘service-class’ employees are not 
invulnerable to a changing economic environment.
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21 Introduction 
Older employees in Britain have been stereotyped as loyal and dependable .  Employers are 
thought to value them, and employees themselves are asked to stay working for more years in 
order to save the welfare state from the crippling costs of longevity (Esping-Anderson, 1996; 
OECD, 2004). However, things have not been going well for older employees, over the past two 
decades.  They have suffered from a disruption of the smooth, predictable transition to retired 
status  through job loss in late career (Beck, 1992).  Some have been driven into the precariat 
(Standing, 2011).   Many others have been stressed out or burnt out by long hours, high work 
demands and the pressures of continuous organizational change (see later).  It is not surprising 
then that older employees’ organizational commitment (OC) has been declining, relative to that 
of younger employees, since the early 1990s (Felstead, 2010).
The present research starts by replicating and extending the existing findings on the decline in 
the work attitudes of older employees.  Its main contribution, however, is to disaggregate those 
findings by socio-economic class (henceforth, ‘class’).  To the question, ‘What makes a class 
analysis worthwhile?’,  four answers can be given.  First, class is a major axis of inequality, and 
inequality remains one of the chief drivers of social research and of political debate.  One 
especially wants to know whether the life-stage of being an older employee represents yet 
another locus of disadvantage for less-skilled/low-paid workers – have  their ‘bad jobs’ been 
turning still worse?  Secondly, the across-class distribution of the age effect bears on debates 
around whether class differences persist in the changing world of ‘late’ capitalism,  or whether 
class differences are disappearing.  This type of debate is complementary to the first, because it 
particularly focuses on the ‘higher’ class of managerial and professional employees,  questioning 
3whether they continue to enjoy the distinctively favoured type of employment relationship that 
has been attributed to them, or whether they have been/are being reduced to a riskier type of  
employment relationship based simply on market forces.  While an age analysis cannot finally 
resolve this debate, it can provide evidence that is highly relevant.  Thirdly, the interpretation of 
the older worker effect itself changes according to whether the effect depends on class.  One can 
hardly talk about a general age effect if that effect is class-dependent.  Fourthly, the practical or 
policy interpretation of the age effect will depend on whether it is concentrated in a particular 
class.  Disaffected workers in the lower (low-pay, low-skill) class may have ‘extended working 
lives’ imposed on them by tax and benefit policies, but such social control will be harder to 
achieve if disaffection also exists where personal resources are greater.   From an employer 
viewpoint, also, the implications for corporate performance, and for HRM response, differ 
depending on how the age-related decline in attitudes is distributed across different classes of 
employee.
The article is framed within several conceptual or theoretical assumptions which we do not argue 
ab initio since they are based in existing literature.   We assume that the work situation of  
individual older employees has altered because of macro-level changes (Hofäcker, 2010)  that 
have affected economies and employers.  We assume that both employer policy and employee 
response follows the ‘rational action’ model of Goldthorpe (2007).   This implies that when 
employers are under external pressures to reduce costs they address areas of high cost where cuts 
are easy;  where employees are adversely affected as a consequence, they downgrade their side 
of the exchange relationship with their employer.  The employee outcomes on which we focus 
are organizational commitment (OC) and overall job satisfaction (OJS),  the most widely used 
4attitudinal measures  in organizational research.  In part these attitudes reflect the utility or value 
of employment for the individual (Clark et al., 2008), in part they constitute the ‘voice’ of 
employees in response to their circumstances,  and thirdly they are strongly predictive of  work 
performance, OCB,  timeliness, attendance, and propensity to quit (Harrison et al., 2006), which 
makes them important for employers.  (For a theoretical basis identifying work attitudes with 
work motivation, see Latham and Pinder, 2005).  We further assume that older employees refer 
to an implicit ‘psychological contract’ that involves their expectations  (Rousseau, 1995): this 
assumption  motivates a contrast of older with younger employees.  Finally, for our measure of 
class, we adopt the schema of Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 27-35) , and to interpret what class 
means, we follow Goldthorpe’s  (2007)  explanation in terms of differently constituted 
employment relationships offered by employers.  
While a class analysis of the age effect is the main new contribution of this article, there are two 
other ways in which it breaks new ground.  The coverage of both organizational commitment 
(OC) and overall job satisfaction (OJS) – together constituting the ‘overall job attitude’ of 
Harrison et al. (2006) – has not previously been attempted in any study of older British 
employees.   Further, the 20-year period over which comparisons are made is the longest for this 
group; and for the first time, the investigation includes the period from before the 2008 financial 
recession to after it, testing whether older employees’ attitudes became more favourable under 
conditions when some might consider themselves lucky still to have paid work.  
2.  The changing treatment of older employees, and the role of class
2.1 Older employees under traditional and new dispensations
5British labour historians (e.g. Russell, 1991) have shown that from the early 1800s there were 
large employers who offered job security, and discretionary privileges such as sick pay, to ‘loyal’ 
older employees.  Out of this gradually emerged the elaborate systems of workplace benefits,  
notably occupational pensions, that came to characterize the large-firm and public sectors in 
Britain.  In the USA’s primary sector, still more complex systems known as ‘internal labour 
markets’ became established in the twentieth century, and these too tended to favour older and 
long-serving employees (Edwards, 1979).  
Why would employers  offer such advantages to older employees, when they are both costly and 
restrictive from the employer viewpoint?  Lazear (1981) answers the question with his incentive 
theory of deferred compensation.  Assuming that older employees get pay and benefits that cost 
in excess of their current productive contribution, employers partly offset the costs by under-
rewarding young employees relative to their productivity (with an implied promise of later 
recompense), and gain outright by saving on the costs of direct supervision and performance 
monitoring systems.  It  pays employees to put up with initial under-payment in order to get 
favourable treatment later on;  and it pays them to work conscientiously so that they will still be 
employed to collect on the deferred benefits.   Then too, the sociological theory of the life-course 
points to further advantage for older employees coming from institutionalization of the 
retirement transition via State pension systems – in Western economies especially (see Hofäcker, 
2010).
However, as noted in our opening paragraph, this favourable dispensation for older employees 
has been breaking down.  In part this can be regarded as just an aspect of the general dislocation 
6of the post-war ‘Golden Age’ through technological change, and restructuring of international 
trade, competition and finances that accelerated during the 1990s.  This background set of 
developments has been referred to variously by labels such as ‘globalization’ (Beck, 1992; 
Dreher, 2008), ‘informational economy’ (Castells, 2000), and ‘marketization’ (Cappelli, 1999).  
What these diverse labels and viewpoints share is the perception of rapid and interconnected 
macro-level changes that permeate contemporary market economies.  From the specific 
viewpoint of older employees, there are two major drivers of change.  One is the intensification 
of cost pressures on employers,  while the other is the use of information and communications 
technology to monitor performance  (Green, 2006; McGovern et al., 2007).  The costly older 
employee’s job becomes at risk, and in parallel the deferred compensation regime becomes less 
attractive to employers, thus exposing older employees to the general increase in work pressure 
or work demands that has been documented by Green (2006).  There is substantial evidence that 
these have been actual rather than potential or theoretical developments.  For insecurity and job 
loss, there is the USA manufacturing study of  Koeber and Wright (2001) and the wide-ranging 
European reviews of Guillemard and Rein (1993) and Hofäcker (2010); recent official statistics 
show that compulsory redundancy has become the most common reason for job exit among older 
employees in Britain.1  Movement of older British employees into marginal or precarious jobs 
has been reported by Lissenbergh and Smeaton (2003), McNair (2006), Roberts (2006) and Lain 
(2012).  Older employee experience of work pressures has also been widely reported (Johnson, 
2004; McNair and Flynn, 2005; Loretto and White, 2006; Smeaton and Vegeris, 2009; Smeaton 
et al., 2010); while de Jonge (2007) and Hintsa et al. (2015)  suggest the importance of an 
imbalance between effort and reward.   Several studies have reported that the experience of work 
strain, high workload and/or lack of personal control is implicated with intentions of older 
7employees to retire early (e.g., Lin and Hsieh, 2001; Barnes et al., 2002;  Higgs et al., 2003) or 
with actual early retirement (e.g. Smeaton et al., 2010; Hintsa et al., 2015). 
It is possible that decline in the attitudes of older employees is merely part of a wider societal 
tendency.  We argue however that older employees will react more negatively to a declining 
work situation than younger employees over the period in review.  This is because they have 
been socialized into expecting  favourable treatment to come in their elder years, and have 
undergone the less favourable treatment in earlier years on that basis.  They therefore experience 
intensified work pressures and rising insecurity as a breach of an implicit contract, a reneging on 
the part of employers.  This interpretation is consistent with the theory of psychological contracts 
(Rousseau, 1995)  and specifically in regard to contract breaches and consequent negativity 
(Robinson, 1996; Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler, 2000).  Our argument, then, is that older 
employees have more negative attitudes/evaluations than younger employees not because they 
are worse affected but because they have lost more of what they expected to get.2
A fundamentally different route to predicting an age effect is by reference to what are taken to be 
distinctive motivations or emotions among older workers, especially those resulting from change 
in resources or goals with ageing.   For instance, the ‘conservation of resources’ (COR) 
perspective (Wright & Hobfoll, 2004)  contends that people seek to build up and maintain coping 
resources to manage their work and life, while older employees experience these resources being 
pared away and thus become emotionally fragile.  Treadway et al (2005), deploying the COR 
perspective, argue that older employees tend to cope less well with threats at work.   Theories of 
this type – there are several others 3 -  imply that older employees will be reacting somewhat 
8negatively to all manner of pressures.  Thus, one can interpret negative attitudes consequent on 
the secular rise in work pressure and insecurity as yet another instance of vulnerability due to 
ageing.  But this characterization of older employees’ motivational or emotional  state is 
debatable for several reasons.  It risks being used in support of the negative stereotyping of older 
employees that has been extensively refuted by Ng and Feldman’s (2012) meta-analysis. It also 
appears inconsistent with several detailed studies by work psychologists that reveal positive 
motivation among older employees, and/or considerable complexity in the relations between age, 
work situation and individual responses.  The review by Matthieu and Zajac (1990) found age to 
be positively related to ‘attitudinal’ (affective) commitment.  Ng and Feldman (2008) reviewing 
a range of studies report older employees exhibiting positive behaviours such as OCB, safe 
working, timeliness and good attendance.  The meta-analysis of Kooij et al. (2010) finds older 
employees positively responsive to teamworking  and flexible work schedules, that are usually 
reckoned characteristic of new work organization.  Mauno et al. (2013) in a study of job stressors 
and subjective well-being found that in some circumstances older age reduced the negative effect 
of high workload.  See also Kooij et al. (2011) for nuanced evidence of complexities in age-
motivation relationships.
While we acknowledge the promise of resource-based motivational theories to explicate the 
response processes of  employees, we feel its most useful application at present is in exploring 
the  micro-to-micro level, in studies such as Mauno et al. (2013), where local variations in 
response are of most interest.  For the economy-wide response of older employees to 
macrosocial change, we require a theory that points to a common denominator across many 
different local and personal circumstances.  Older employees’ responses to external pressures 
9and challenges may vary in a great many ways according to context and individual (including 
motivational) differences, but a common element across most individuals will be a rational 
appraisal of their situation relative to expectations (Goldthorpe 2007 (1): 139-62).
Finally there is a considerable body of research that focuses not on whether, why or how older 
employees have come to be problematical in some way, but rather on what policies and practices 
on the part of employers will ameliorate their situation and/or performance.  These include 
reviews and studies of HRM practices in relation to age (see Kooij et al., 2010; 2011; 2014). 
While we do not gainsay the interest of this approach, it generally does not address the issues set 
out in our introduction since it lacks both an historical perspective and a macro-to-micro 
framework.  Partial exceptions are Hennekam and Herrbach (2013) and  Hintsa et al. (2015), 
both of whom acknowledge the adverse effects of high workload and work stressors on which 
we also lay emphasis.
2.2 Class concepts in relation to older employees
The point of the present article is not to talk of ‘the older employee’ in an altogether general 
way, but to consider whether different classes of employee are differentially exposed to change 
and risk. To simplify discussion and analysis of class, we adopt the three-class condensed 
schema of Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 35-47)(henceforth, EG).   Setting aside non-employees 
(proprietors, self-employed, unemployed, etc.), the schema consists of an ‘upper’ grouping of 
managers and professionals (often referred to as the ‘service class’), a ‘lower’ grouping of 
employees doing semi-routine and routine work – for the most part low-paid,  and an 
‘intermediate’ grouping that includes those in administrative, supervisory,  and technician 
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(including some skilled manual) jobs that are below managerial or professional level.   British 
official statistics use the NS-SEC (National Statistics Socio-Economic Class) system that is 
consistent with EG theory and can be collapsed to the 3-class form.  
It is possible to see these classes as merely a convenient grouping of occupations, but this is to 
ignore the theory that underlies the grouping, as expounded by Goldthorpe (2007 (2): 101-24).  
Occupations are conceived to vary along two main axes, skill-asset specificity (degree of 
specialized or firm-specific knowledge) and difficulty/ease of monitoring.  McGovern et al. 
(2007: 70-80) test this concept and conclude that it is supported in British data.  Higher skill 
level generally implies greater cognitive complexity, and this affects the employer’s choice of an 
effective means of control and monitoring.  Beyond this obvious point we need not discuss the 
skill dimension further for present purposes (see however Tählin, 2007).  Our focus is rather on 
the ease/difficulty of monitoring.
Goldthorpe (2007) argued that for the ‘lower’ class, with its relatively simple and replaceable 
skills and easily measured outputs, the employment relationship is tenuous and monitoring is 
exercised by direct supervision and/or output-based incentives, without any long-term 
commitment to job security.  The ‘upper’ class of managers and professionals, on the other hand, 
has complex skills and knowledge that is crucial to the employer’s interests, and incentives are 
supplied through salaries, promotions, service increments and pensions, all of which construct a 
long-term employment relationship.   Finally, the intermediate class is managed in a way that is 
partially like the service class but can also have elements of more direct control, as illustrated in 
call-centres.  
11
The chief technical change of the 1990s that  affected monitoring/control was the spread of 
information and communications technology (ICT) and associated changes in work organization.  
The varied ways in which this set of changes affected, or was capable of affecting, work intensity 
have been analysed by Green (2006: 68-93) and McGovern et al. (2007: 169-71).    Another 
relevant change during the 1990s took place in the distribution of incentive payment systems 
across classes.  McGovern et al. (2007: 167-8) report that the greatest increases in the use of 
incentive pay during the 1990s were at managerial and professional level – by 2000 three in four 
of senior managers and professionals were getting some form of incentive payment.  One should 
also note the continuing widespread use of workforce reductions and redundancy programmes 
through economically favourable conditions as well as in periods of economic contraction 
(Turnbull and Wass, 2000) and in the public sector as well as the market sector.  Insecurity is 
part of the ‘incentive’ mechanism.
What then are the implications of these major changes specifically for older employees in each 
class?  At the intermediate and lower skill-levels, these appear straightforward.  The increased 
use of ICT monitoring appears to have been a major influence on work intensification and work 
strain in these groups (McGovern et al., 2007).  Employees at these levels have also felt 
threatened by the wide use of labour-shedding, and this constrains them to accept rising work 
demands (Burchell et al., 2002).  Older employees in these class-groups will thereby be exposed 
to closer control and to rising insecurity if they are unable to achieve sufficient productivity to 
match their relatively high employment cost.
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Predictions become more debatable in regard to the managerial and professional employees – 
EG’s service class.   The pay, pensions and perquisites they get make older employees in this 
group a prime target for employers to seek cost reductions and effort increases.  Some theorists 
have argued more generally that occupational class differences in treatment are being washed 
away as employers rely more on the external market to establish pay and conditions, and as 
managers and professionals themselves become more mobile (Cappelli, 1999); the limit position 
of this argument is that the class concept becomes redundant because employers are relying 
wholly on a market for skills and knowledge (Sørensen, 2000).  If that is the case, then one 
would expect to find older managers and professionals losing their privileged position and 
affected just like in other occupations  by more pressure and tighter monitoring, while no longer 
able to extract class ‘rents’  (Sørensen, 2000)  through deferred compensation and benefits.4  The 
increased use of financial incentives for managers and professionals, noted above, surely 
indicates a greater emphasis on short-term performance, while the study of Worrall and Cooper 
(2001) showed managers in particular under considerable strain from continuous organizational 
change. This view has been countered however by arguments that employers have limited scope 
for changing the established treatment of the service class.  In such arguments it is pointed out 
that the salaried employment relationship offered to the service class  (making heavy use of 
deferred rewards, e.g. via increments, promotions and pensions) is the one that most reliably 
ensures the availability of expertise that is crucial for employers.  So it is argued that the 
preferential treatment of managers and professionals is unlikely to be disturbed by the return of 
commodified employment relations that are affecting other ranks of employees (Breen, 1997).  
Again, if managers and professionals know better than their employers how to achieve 
organizational progress and innovation, then any move toward tightly specified incentives for 
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them is likely to have detrimental effects on the organization such as through a distorting focus 
on short-term objectives (Goldthorpe, 2007 (2): 113-14) .  Indeed, the recent disasters in the 
British financial sector have been popularly attributed to just such perverse incentives. To lend 
empirical support to this perhaps somewhat abstract argument, one can point out that many of 
Britain’s large employers drew back at the end of the 1990s from the ‘delayering’ movement, in 
which middle management was being stripped away, in order to restore career paths for this 
group (see, e.g., CIPD, 2003). On the basis of these arguments, then, one would expect older 
managers and professionals to be largely excluded from a contraction of deferred reward or from 
intensified work demands.  Then one would also expect the main impact of older-employee cost 
reductions to fall still more heavily on other occupational classes below the 
managerial/professional level, where work pressures and performance demands can with less risk 
to the employer be ramped up by means such as those described by Green (2006).   
 
3. Hypotheses
The withdrawal or contraction of  favourable treatment for older employees is presumed to have 
negative implications for their overall work attitudes.  Because the expectations built up in early 
career were for a more favourable treatment after long service, older employees are hypothesized 
to be more affected by a sense of ‘contract violation’ than younger employees.  Using OC and 
OJS (‘overall job attitudes’: Harrison et al., 2006)  as outcome variables, we propose the 
following fundamental hypothesis:
H1:  Overall job attitudes of older employees, relative to younger employees, move in a 
negative direction over the 1992-2012 period.
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With regard to class differences in the age effect, we steer a middle course between the polar 
positions.  We are inclined to doubt whether managers and professionals ever had a position of 
power with respect to their employers, such that they could extract rents in the sense of Sørensen 
(2000).  The special nature of the skills of managers and professionals is appraised by Breen 
(1997) and Goldthorpe (2007 (2)) as giving them a rationally-based market power leading to 
high levels of reward.  The question at issue is whether employers have the technical means to 
leverage more effort in return for these high rewards.  In our judgement, such means are in fact 
provided by the development in the recent decades of personal appraisal systems and of 
quantified performance incentives.  Employers are certainly taking advantage of these 
techniques.  Furthermore, the threat of dismissal in case of inadequate performance has always 
been required by incentive interpretations of deferred compensation (Lazear, 1981) and this 
threat is more potent when deferred rewards are high, as in the case of managers and 
professionals, and when redundancy has become a standard instrument of corporate employment 
practice.  In short, we judge that there is scope for tightening the effort-reward bargain while still 
leaving enough difference to keep managerial and professional occupations distinctive and 
attractive.  We therefore formulate a second hypothesis as follows:
H2:  Overall job attitudes of older employees within each class, including the service 
class (managers and professionals),  become more negative relative to younger 
employees within that class over the 1992-2012 period.
15
We make no prediction as to whether the age effect within the service class is greater or less than 
the age effect within another class, nor whether there are different age effects between the 
intermediate and lower classes, since there is reason to predict negative reactions among older 
employees in each class.  Our investigation in this last respect is exploratory.
4  Data and variables
4.1 Data
The research uses four cross-sectional survey datasets representative of British employees at 
different times and different stages in the business cycle: for 1992,  the ‘Employment in Britain’  
survey; for 2001 and 2006 the ‘Skills Surveys’ of those years (SK01 and SK06: Felstead, 2010); 
and for 2012 the Skills and Employment Survey (SES2012).  Age limits of 20-60 have been 
applied throughout.  The surveys given these age limits provide samples of 3458 employees in 
1992 (71 per cent response rate), 4005 in 2001 (63 per cent response rate), 4237 in 2006 (57 per 
cent response), and 2377 in 2012 (49 per cent response). The decline in response rates over these 
years has been general to social surveys in Britain.  Booster samples for certain geographical 
areas were obtained in the 2006 and 2012 surveys but these boosters are excluded from the 
present analysis so as to maintain uniform spatial representation across the surveys.   All four 
surveys had a similar sampling design, and information was in all cases collected from 
respondents by means of  personal interviews in the home. Sampling weights are provided with 
the source datasets, which are available with documentation in the UK Data Archive.
4.2 Dependent variables
The analysis uses measures of (1) overall job satisfaction (OJS), and (2) affective organizational 
commitment (OC).  OJS is obtained by the familiar single-item measure, here with a seven-point 
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response scale. Affective OC measures the degree to which an employee identifies with the goals 
and values of an organization and is willing to exert effort to help it succeed (Kalleberg and 
Berg, 1987).  It is here measured as the sum of six agreement items that were first used by 
Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990).  The items have a reliability (Cronbach alpha) in these surveys of 
0.79.  Estimated effects for the OC and OJS measures can be interpreted directly as proportions 
of a unit of response.   Item wording and descriptives are shown in Table 1.  
[Table 1 about here]
4.3 Explanatory variables
The chief explanatory variables are time period,  age group, and class.  Year 1992 represents the 
third year of  a severe economic downturn in Britain, which began with a 1990 recession and 
ended after 1993. The 1990s as a whole  are the watershed when ICT, with associated 
organizational change, became widely established  and where globalized competition and 
finances ramped steeply up (Dreher et al., 2008). Year 2012 represents the fifth year of the 
economic downturn that began with a financial sector crisis in 2008. Both 1992 and 2012 come 
two years before the start of economic upturns.  Year 2001 came at a high point for the British 
economy, following six years of steady growth and peak profitability.  By year 2006 the 
economy still appeared to be stable and growing, although private sector profitability had fallen 
somewhat and employment growth was largely maintained by public sector expansion.
Age 50 is the most usual cut-off for defining older workers (Felstead, 2010), and in Britain this 
appears consistent with managerial perceptions ( Loretto and White, 2006).  Age 50 has also 
until recently been the usual cut-off when pensionable early retirement is permitted (if at all) in 
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occupational pension schemes.5  Comparisons are made with younger and prime-age employees 
in the 20-49 age bracket.  Excluding people aged over 60 reduces the problem of sample 
selection, because beyond 60 is when early retirement or incapacity (disability or chronic illness) 
is particularly common.
The measure of class is derived from the NSSEC (National Statistics Socio-Economic 
Classification) scale that is closely modelled on the EG schema.  There are 30 occupational 
categories, of which 4 are excluded here as they apply only to self-employed people.   The 
remaining 26 categories are then collapsed into six that correspond to the broad class categories 
presented in Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 35-47).  These are: higher managerial and 
professional; lower, or associate, managerial and professional; administrative; lower supervisory 
and technical; semi-routine occupations; and routine occupations.  To maintain sample adequacy 
when interacted with age-group, classes are further condensed into three: the higher or service 
class (managerial/professional occupations); the intermediate class (administrative, supervisory, 
and technical occupations); and the lower class (semi-routine and routine occupations); such a 
grouping is also used by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993).  
The strength of an analysis specification depends on what variables are judiciously excluded as 
well as on what variables are present. We do not introduce perceived workplace practices into 
the set of explanatory variables, even though a number of relevant variables are present in the 
source data.  Kooij et al. (2010) review studies that have related workplace practices, as reported 
by employees, to the attitudes of older employees.  There are also a great many studies that use 
workplace practices reported by employees (especially HRM practices)  as regressors without 
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any particular orientation toward older employees (e.g., Gong et al., 2009; Nishii et al., 2008; 
Takeuchi et al., 2007; 2009).  Our view is that this method is open to common method artefact 
(Posdakoff et al., 2003) and to omitted variable bias, and should accordingly be avoided.  For 
instance, employees who are more satisfied are also more likely to say that various HRM 
practices are present in their workplace, especially if as often the case the questioning about the 
practices is value-laden (this difficulty is noted in Kooij et al., 2010).  Furthermore, unless the set 
of practices is sufficiently extensive, and appropriately summarized, there is a risk that 
unobserved practices will be correlated with those present in the analysis, thus violating a 
fundamental assumption of the regression model (for further discussion Wright et al., 2005; 
White and Bryson, 2013).  
4.4 Control variables
Control variables address compositional changes over time that potentially vary between age-
groups and could affect attitudes. As older people have lower participation rates than younger, it 
is important to control for the variables that are commonly assumed to affect the employment 
participation decision.  These comprise gender; highest educational qualification (age and class 
are already present as explanatory variables);  and family situation, with questions about whether 
the respondent had a partner, and whether any under-16 dependent child was present. These 
family questions were interacted with gender because of their different importance for labour 
market participation between women and men.  A second group of control variables concerned 
the type of organization in which the individual worked, with a five-category variable for 
workplace size, ranging from 10 or less, to 500 or over, dummies for private sector and for 
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presence of a trade union, and a classification of industries into six broad groups (primary; 
manufacturing; construction; consumer services; finance and business services; public services).  
Numerous studies in the literature on older employees include a tenure variable in their analysis 
specification (Kooij et al., 2010 reports on studies that examine the relationship between age and 
OC or OJS while controlling for tenure; Bal et al., 2013 argue that age effects change with 
tenure). Unfortunately, tenure is hard to measure without error (because of problems of 
memory); this ‘errors in variables’ problem can however be ‘fixed’ by dichotomization at the 
median (Wald, 1940).  More problematically, in models of overall job attitude, tenure is prone to 
reverse causation (because attitudes influence the probability of job separation) and this may 
inflate estimates of the tenure effect and distort the overall covariance structure. This is a 
problem for which there is no easy ‘fix’.6 Accordingly we do not include tenure in our preferred 
specification.  However, we run variant analyses that do include tenure (in the dichotomized 
above-median v below-median form) as a test of the robustness of our specification.
5  Analysis
The analysis method is robust regression, with OC and OJS analysed in turn. Robust regression 
is an OLS-like methodology which takes account of weighting and complex survey design in 
calculating standard errors (Berk, 1990).  The dependent variables are treated as having cardinal 
(interval) measurement scales.  
The analysis is in three stages.  In the first stage, confined to the OC and OJS outcomes, the 
focus is on the effect of being an older employee, relative to being a younger/prime age 
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employee, averaged across class-groups (thus testing H1).  In the second stage, the relative effect 
of being an older employee is interacted with class-group, so that age effects can be separately 
obtained for older employees within each class (thus testing H2 and providing other information 
of an exploratory type).  The third stage is to test the robustness of results to inclusion of a tenure 
variable. 
The methods involved in obtaining these estimates can be further specified as follows.  For the 
first analysis stage (H1), in each survey the partial effect of age is estimated by the coefficient on 
the 50-plus dummy, which  is equivalent to the conditional mean difference in attitude between 
the two age-groups.  These coefficients can then be compared between any two survey time-
points.  (Multiple-time comparisons are avoided since these may inflate test statistics: see 
Bertrand et al., 2004).  We are most interested in two over-time comparisons, 2012 against 1992 
(the 20-year change in attitudes, comparing similar points in the business cycle)  and 2012 
against 2006 (the pre-recession to post-recession change in attitudes).  Year 2001 plays a 
supporting role in developing the interpretation.  Comparing age effects across years is 
analogous to the ‘difference in differences’ estimate that has been widely used in evaluation 
research (see Wooldridge, 2002: 130-2).  An advantage offered by the design is that it removes 
unobserved differences between the age groups to the extent that these are constant over time.  
The design thus helps reduce the potential problem of persistent unobserved influences, such as 
positivity/negativity of outlook, which may vary with age, on attitudinal expressions (see Ferrer-
i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). On the assumption that such age-specific unobserved differences 
continue across time periods, the design differences them out.  
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In the second stage of analysis (H2), the above specification is enlarged by inclusion of an 
interaction term between the age-group dummy and the 3-level class-group measure, while 
analysis continues to be carried out separately for each year.  Model estimates for interactions do 
not directly yield the effects of interest, since each variable in the interaction depends partly on 
the other variable for its effect (see Wooldridge, 2002: 15-18).  To clarify the results, therefore, 
the model estimates are used to compute the predicted mean marginal (or partial) effects of age-
class combinations within year.7  These predicted mean marginal effects can then be compared 
(differenced) in a variety of ways.  Most simply, we can consider how the effect of age (50-plus 
v. under-50) changes across years within a particular class group, say the upper/service class. We 
refer to these as the within-class effects.  This provides a double-difference estimate  of the same 
type as that obtained in the first stage analysis, but filtered on class.  One may also go further and 
compare such double-difference estimates across a pair of occupational class groups, say upper 
versus lower.  This yields a triple-difference estimate, permitting tests of differences between 
class-groups in the age-group differences over time. 
6  Results
In the following, the shorthand expression ‘age effect’ and similar phrases stand for the 
estimated effect of the older (50-plus) group relative to the younger (under 50) group, in a given 
year.  Differences between years, within classes and between classes always refer implicitly to a 
comparison of age effects.
6.1 The relative overall attitude of older employees over time
Table 2 presents the age effects on OC and OJS for each of the four years. All analyses include 
the full set of controls, but for reasons of space, only the estimates for the age effects are shown 
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(full results are available on the authors’ institutional web-site).  Panel (a) summarizes the results 
for OC and panel (b) for OJS.  In the initial year, 1992, both age effects were significantly 
positive, as was to be expected on the basis of pre-1990s research.  The estimated age effects on 
each attitude then falls progressively across the subsequent survey-years; by 2012 the age effect 
for OC is significantly negative, and while that for OJS remains positive it is not significantly 
different from zero. Differences between years are shown at the right-hand columns of Table 2.  
Considering the difference (2012 v. 1992), the change in the age effect for OC is -1.72, with an 
associated t-statistic (absolute value) of 5.66; the corresponding figures for OJS are -0.208 and 
1.97.  The across-recession fall (2012 relative to 2006) is also significant for OC (-0.4981, 
t=1.99)  but not for OJS.   The picture of over-time decline for OJS is gentle but steady; 
differences from 1992 are not significant in 2001 and 2006, nor is the 2012 v. 2006 difference 
significant.  
[Table 2 about here]
Overall, these results provide strong evidence of declining overall attitude among older 
employees, consistent with H1.  There is no indication that this tendency weakens over time.  
Experience of the severe recession starting in 2008 did not lift older employees’ attitudes with 
feelings of relative good luck to be in a job, rather there was a further significant fall between 
2006 and 2012 in the case of OC, and a continuing gentle decline in the case of OJS.  
6.2 Older employees’ overall attitude within occupational class groups
Having confirmed the general picture regarding older employees’ overall job attitude, we now 
examine the role of  class.  Table 3 provides the relevant results for OC.  As explained in  section 
5, we present these results in terms of marginal mean predictions, and these are shown separately 
for each age-group within each class-group, so as to give a more complete picture.  The age-
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group within class effects are the differences between the age-specific marginal mean 
predictions, and these differences are the basis for over-time comparisons that are shown in the 
right-hand columns of the table.  
The main points to be drawn from Table 3 are as follows.  (1)  By 2001 age effects of OC within 
each class have declined from  their initially positive level and are not statistically 
distinguishable from zero.  (2) Over the 20-year period 1992 to 2012, the age effect on OC 
declines significantly both within the higher or service class  and within the lower class.  There is 
also a decrease in  OC within the intermediate class but it is not statistically significant.  (3) The 
20-year difference within the higher class is not significantly greater than that within the lower 
class (t=1.55).  (4)  The difference in OC between 2006 and 2012 is significant at the 10 per cent 
level8 within the higher class-group (t=1.72).  
Membership of the higher/service class evidently did not  insulate older employees from 
declining OC.  This is consistent with H2.  But close inspection of Table 3 shows that the within-
service-class age effect resulted as much from an absolute increase in OC among younger and 
prime-aged managers and professionals as from an absolute decline in OC among older 
managers and professionals.  Moreover, even in 2012 the absolute levels of mean predicted OC 
in the higher class-group are as high as or higher than the absolute levels in the intermediate and 
lower class-groups, whether one considers the older or the younger age category. 
[Table 3 about here]
24
In a similar way Table 4 presents results for the OJS measure. As was the case with OC, the age 
effect on OJS was positive in 1992 irrespective of  class.  In 2001 this remained the case within 
the intermediate and lower classes but not in the service class, where the effect became non-
significant. Moreover,  within the service class the age effect for OJS fell significantly between 
1992 and 2001 (by -0.33, t=2.19), and this fall was significantly greater than within the 
intermediate class (the between-class difference has t=2.05) and within the lower class-group 
(t=2.25).   In 2006 and 2012 the age effects had become non-significant within each class-group, 
but the service class was still moving in a negative direction relative to the lower (significant at 
the 5 per cent level in 2006).   Over the 20-year period the age effect for OJS fell significantly in 
the higher class (by -0.37, t=2.36), but the difference across the 2008 recession was non-
significant.   The 20-year differences within the other two classes were small and not statistically 
significant.  Overall, the evidence is not sufficiently systematic for us to be confident that 
differences in OJS between the class-groups existed over the 20-year perspective.  However there 
is reasonably strong evidence here that the OJS of older employees relative to younger was 
declining within the service class, consistent with H2.  
[Table 4 about here]
6.3  The robustness of overall attitude analyses to inclusion of a tenure variable
Section 4 explained why tenure was not included in our preferred specification for analysis of 
overall attitudes.  Table 5 compares the estimated age-class effects on overall attitudes for 
models that include/exclude the tenure variable.  For simplicity of presentation we use age 
effects separately estimated for each class, rather than the marginal effects from age x class 
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interaction models as in Tables 3 and 4.  The estimates when tenure is excluded are very similar 
to those previously presented.
[Table 5 about here]
The inclusion of a tenure variable makes very little difference to the estimated age-class effects.  
Moreover, from a comparison of the model F-ratio statistics it can be seen that including tenure 
makes little difference to model fit.9  We conclude that the main specification is robust to 
inclusion/exclusion of the tenure variable.  Estimates for the tenure variable itself are included in 
Table 5 but should be regarded with caution for the reasons given in section 4.
7  Conclusions and discussion
The chief findings concerning H1, which we set up to frame analysis of  overall job attitude 
among older employees as a whole, are as follows. The age effect is significantly negative for 
OC for both the 2012 v 1992 comparison and for the 2012 v 2006 comparison; for OJS, it is 
significantly negative for the 2012 v 1992 comparison. Thus the analyses provide strong 
evidence in support of  H1.  There is an age effect of declining overall attitudes that spans the 
whole 20-year period.  
Disaggregating by class-group (H2), the age effect is negatively signed for five of the six 2012 v 
1992 and 2012 v 2006 comparisons and positively signed only for the intermediate class on OJS 
over the 2012 v 2006 period.  For the service class the age effect is significantly negative for 
both OC and OJS in the 20-year comparison, and for the 2012 v 2006 comparison it remains 
significant for OC on a 10 per cent criterion.10  The age effect is also significant for the lower 
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occupational class-group on the OC measure over the 2012 v. 1992 comparison, though not for 
the 2012 v 2006 comparison.  The age effects however are non-significant for the intermediate 
class-group.  
There are several points of significant difference between the service class and either the 
intermediate class or the lower class, and these always show the age effect more negative in the 
service class.  However, these differences are not found uniformly, and some comparisons are 
statistically inconclusive, so one cannot assert that the service class has a more negative age 
effect overall.  A plausible hypothesis for future research is that the service class is heading 
downward relative to the other classes in terms of overall job attitude among older members, but 
it will need further data to test this.  Again, the absence of significantly negative age effects for 
the intermediate class should not be taken to show that older employees in this class have fared 
‘better’; mostly the estimates for this class do not differ significantly from those of the other 
classes.  
Case study and qualitative research can provide more concrete interpretations of the average 
tendencies suggested in our quantitative study.   Here we can only offer a few indications.  Older 
professional and managerial workers have been found to place decreasing priority on extrinsic 
job characteristics such as pay, promotion and status, attributing greater value instead  to intrinsic 
characteristics such as: autonomy, work-life balance, good workplace relationships and job 
security (Sturges, 1999; Smola and Sutton, 2002; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2004; Bown-Wilson and 
Parry, 2013). These late career preferences  are in direct conflict with employment practices that 
intensify the work experience (undermining work-life balance), and threaten security.  Such 
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developments represent a still greater change when related to the expectations of this previously 
privileged class.
The introduction stated four purposes of a class analysis of older employees’ attitudes, and these 
can now be used to frame a brief discussion of findings.  The research indicates, firstly, that the 
age effect is not distributed in such a way as to increase inequality to any marked degree.  
Admittedly, older employees in the class of routine and semi-routine employees, usually 
regarded as the most disadvantaged, have had deteriorating attitudes,  suggestive of further 
negative experience of employment.  But this is also true of older employees in the service class 
that is generally regarded as the most privileged.  On the other hand, it can be argued that this is 
of little consolation to the less skilled workers who have long suffered the indignity of insecure, 
tightly controlled and closely monitored working conditions. The fact that their OC has 
continued to fall, even from initially low levels, at least confirms and underlines the relative 
disadvantages associated with low skill and low paid work.  Roberts (2006)  provides an 
extended case study of how a deteriorating work situation impacts on older manual workers and 
there are varied insights into the precarity and stress experienced by this group in the literature 
cited in  section 2.1. 
The second and complementary implication to be drawn concerns the employment relationship 
of the service class.  The findings tell against those who have argued that this class is 
invulnerable to the pressures of a ‘globalized’ or ‘marketized’ economic order.  Older managers 
and professionals have it seems been disappointed at least as much as other classes of employees.  
On the other hand, the evidence of Tables 3 and 4 does not suggest that the service class as a 
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whole has lost its distinctive and advantageous position vis-à-vis other classes.  The findings 
suggest, rather, that there has been some reallocation of advantage between younger and older 
members of the service class – with the most expensive (i.e., the older) losing relative to the less 
expensive (younger).   
The same evidence also strengthens the interpretation of the age effect on attitudes. The age 
effect has wide generality, and is not dependent on the experience of a particular class.  The main 
gap in this respect is the lack of conclusive findings concerning the intermediate class. On the 
overall evidence, one can reasonably go on talking about a general age effect, but one should 
avoid any strong assertion that the age effect is uniform until this gap has been filled by further 
case research on intermediate occupations.  At present there is a dearth of qualitative research 
outside of call-centres.   There are however scattered clues in that literature about possible 
positive consequences in terms of increased promotion chances (Belt, 2002) and opportunities 
for exercising personal skills (Yeuk-Mui, 2001); these exceptions to the general run of the 
literature suggest we do not yet have a rounded picture.  
Fourthly, the findings, despite limitations that we have noted, are sufficiently strong to have 
implications for the public policy and the policies of employers. The process of cost reduction 
undermines attitudes and motivation among older employees and (from the findings of Harrison 
et al., 2006) this is likely to lead to reduced performance and higher rates of voluntary quitting. 
This may be efficient from an employer perspective, in that a thinning-out of older employees, 
keeping the most productive, has been an acknowledged element in the theory of optimal 
compensation (Lazear, 1981).  But it is possibly not efficient from the perspective of public 
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policy that seeks high levels of participation and ‘extended working life’, and is also currently 
concerned over productivity (see Phillipson, 2013 for policy discussion of these tensions).  As 
employers become better informed about the declining attitudes portrayed here, they may focus 
particularly on the implications of declining motivation among the managerial-professional 
group, because of this group’s large impact on added value.  It is in relation to them that 
innovative HRM policies for older employees are most likely to emerge.  Alternatively, 
employers may simply assume that any problem of motivational decline with age will diminish 
in future cohorts.  
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Notes
1. ‘ Insecurity’ includes actual and threatened job loss, whereas in Britain ‘precarity’ has 
generally referred to temporary, casual and freelance employment contracts. Typically, 
employees aged 50-64 account for 1 in 4 of all redundancies and at its 2008/9 peak the 
redundancy rate for this group reached 1 in 10: source, Office of National Statistics, quarterly 
summaries (series RED02: Redundancies by industry, age, sex and re-employment rates); own 
calculations. 
2.  We interpret the psychological contract in terms of expectations: this was the original 
formulation, but recently a concept of obligation has been introduced that we find unhelpful.  See 
Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (2000) for overview.
3. A theory  in some respects similar to COR is Person-Environment-Fit (PEF)  (French, Caplan 
& Van Harrison, 1982), in  which job stress is presented as a relationship between the person and 
the environment that is appraised by the person as exceeding resources and risking wellbeing. 
Resources are also a central focus in the human development lifespan theory of selection, 
optimisation and compensation (Baltes et al., 1999).
4.  Sørensen (2000) regarded the deferred rewards provided for older employees as efficient 
incentives and excluded them from the service class’s ‘rents’.
5.  In 2010 the British government required pension schemes to raise the eligibility threshold for 
early retirement to 55.
6.  The textbook solution is to instrument tenure and perform a two-stage least squares analysis.  
Valid instrumental variables however tend to be elusive.
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7. The mean marginal effect is the difference in predicted means under the model as the age-
group variable within class-group goes from 0 (under-50) to 1 (50-plus), while all other variables 
in the model are left at their observed values.
8. The t-statistics can be interpreted as one-tailed when the sign of the estimated effect agrees 
with hypothesis, thus making 10 per cent significance equivalent to 5 per cent significance in the 
two-tailed case.
9.  The more rigorous likelihood-ratio test is not available here since it is invalidated by complex 
survey design.
10.  See note 9.
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OJS +  1992 ‘All in all, how satisfied would you say you are with 


















Wording of OC scale items (‘how much do you agree or disagree?’)*
I find that my values and the organization’s values are quite similar
I feel very little loyalty to this organization
I am proud to be working for this organization
I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help this organization succeed
I would take almost any job to keep working for this organization
 I would turn down another job with more pay in order to stay with this organization
Notes :Statistics are unweighted. 
+  Responses  ‘completely satisfied, very satisfied, fairly satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, fairly 
dissatisfied, very dissatisfied, completely dissatisfied’ with scoring 1-7.  For analysis the scoring has been 
reversed so that completely satisfied = 7.
* Responses ‘Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree’ with scoring 1-4. The scoring has been 
reversed so that strongly agree=4, except in the case of the second  item that already has this sense. An 
answer ‘Don’t know’ is treated as missing data.
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Table 2  Estimated effects on overall attitudes (OC and OJS) of older employee (50+) with 
reference to younger (under-50) employees, and over-time differences 
survey year> 1992 2001 2006 2012 2012-1992 2012-2006
(a) OC                    effects         differences
estimate 1.2438** 0.1756 0.0234 -0.4747* -1.719** -0.4981*
s.e. 0.2243 0.1521 0.1448 0.2045 0.3035 0.2506
N 2659 3632 3703 1864
(b) OJS
estimate 0.2524** 0.1155* 0.1058* 0.0440 -0.2084* -0.0618
s.e. 0.0735 0.0588 0.0520 0.0761 0.1058 0.0922
N 2994 3843 3891 2011
Note: All estimates come from models with complete controls (see text).  Standard errors are 
derived by robust regression.
* significant at the 5 % level ** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3  Mean marginal predictions of OC, with differences, for older and younger 
employees within class-group 
1992 2001 2006 2012 2012-1992 2012-2006
         mean marginal predictions for age group [ & N], with differences below ( & s.e. of difference)
(1)Higher class & 50+ 17.87 [116] 16.88 [344] 16.33 [360] 16.39 [227] -1.48 0.06
(2)Higher class & <50 15.93 [792] 16.67 [1285] 16.37[1173] 17.03 [626]   1.10 0.66
(1)-(2) 1.94 (.37)** 0.22(0.21) -0.04(0.21) -0.63(0.28) -2.58(0.47)** -0.60(0.35)+
(3)Inter class & 50+ 16.68 [121] 16.07 [218] 15.74 [207] 16.24 [139] -0.44 0.50
(4)Inter class & <50 15.97 [658] 15.82 [794] 15.75 [715] 16.33 [363] 0.36 0.58
(3)-(4) 0.71(0.34)* 0.25 (0.27) -0.02 (0.251) -0.09(0.397) -0.80(0.52) -0.08(0.47)
(5)Lower class & 50+ 16.34 [161] 15.31 [250] 15.37 [332] 15.27 [130] -1.07 -0.10
(6)Lower class &  <50 15.32 [771] 15.29 [741] 15.26 [916] 15.77 [379] 0.45 0.51
(5)-(6) 1.02(0.35)** 0.02(0.28) 0.12 (0.25) -0.51(0.36) -1.52(0.50)** -0.61(0.43)
Note: All estimates come from models with complete controls (see text).  Standard errors (in brackets) are derived 
by robust regression.
+ significant at the 10 % level; * significant at the 5 % level; ** significant at the 1 per cent level.
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Table 4  Mean marginal predictions of OJS, with differences, for older and younger 
employees within class-group 
1992 2001 2006 2012 2012-1992 2012-2006
         mean marginal predictions for age group [ & N], with differences below ( & s.e. of difference)
(1)Higher class & 50+ 5.76 [128] 5.27 [362] 5.45 [369] 5.31 [236] -0.45 -0.14
(2)Higher class & <50 5.49 [868] 5.33 [1357] 5.46 [1220] 5.41[669] -0.08 -0.05
(1)-(2) 0.27(0.114)* -0.06(0.099) -0.02(0.075) -0.09(0.108) -0.37(0.157)* -0.09(0.131)
(3)Inter class & 50+ 5.64 [130] 5.33 [228] 5.45 [217] 5.29 [150] -0.35 -0.16
(4)Inter class & <50 5.37 [799] 5.09 [832] 5.33 [747] 5.13 [441] -0.24 -0.20
(3)-(4) 0.27(0.133)* 0.23(0.101)* 0.12(0.088) 0.16(0.131) -0.11(0.187) 0.04(0.158)
(5)Lower class &50+ 5.51 [189] 5.17 [271] 5.39 [361] 5.22 [146] -0.29 -0.17
(6)Lower class & <50 5.26 [880] 4.90 [793] 5.16 [977] 5.01 [399] -0.25 -0.15
(5)-(6) 0.25(0.106)* 0.27(0.108)* 0.23(0.085)* 0.20(0.135) -0.04(0.172) -0.02(0.160)
Note: All estimates come from models with complete controls (see text).  Standard errors (in brackets) are derived 
by robust regression.
+ significant at the 10 % level; * significant at the 5 % level; ** significant at the 1 per cent level.
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Table 5. Age effects by class within year for models with(1)  and without (2) tenure variable
class -> managers and professionals intermediate semi-routine and routine
outcome -> OC OJS OC OJS OC OJS
1992(1) b, s.e. 1.77,0.391** 0.25,0.123* 0.73,0.372+ 0.18,0.137 0.85,0.382* 0.18,0.119
1992(2) b,s.e. 1.86,0.375** 0.26,0.117* 0.88,0.367* 0.29,0.144* 0.89,0.377* 0.20,0.118+
tenure 1992(2) 0.46,0.245+ 0.10,0.077 0.66,0.256** 0.28,0.089** 0.20,0.245 0.07,0.081
F(1),F(2) 3.53,3.46 2.20,2.25 2.61,2.57 2.65,2.33 3.72,3.93 3.26,3.36
2006(1),b,s.e. -0.16,0.213 -0.03,0.082 -0.01,0.264 0.11,0.093 0.11,0.269 0.23,0.094*
2006(2),b,s.e. -0.04,0.212 -0.01,0.078 -0.03,0.262 0.14,0.093 0.17,0.264 0.26,0.096**
tenure 2006(2) 0.43,0.175* 0.07,0.063 -0.03,0.211 0.09,0.076 0.29,0.212 0.20,0.084*
F(1),F(2) 3.95,3.74 2.10,2.11 2.62,2.65 2.44,2.57 3.58,3.70 4.11,4.21
2012(1),b,s.e. -0.58,0.293* -0.06,0.117 -0.21,0.432 0.06,0.143 -0.41,0.369 0.19,0.154
2012(2),b,s.e. -0.54,0.291+ -0.05,0.115 -0.19,0.433 0.07,0.139 -0.38,0.368 0.20,0.143
F(1),F(2) 2.87,3.04 1.49,1.54 1.39,1.43 2.21,2.27 2.36,2.46 2.04,2.13
tenure 2012(2) 0.21,0.239 0.06,0.096 0.10,0.345 0.07,0.121 -0.41,0.369 0.01,0.141
age 2012(1)-1992(1) -2.35,0.489** -0.31,0.170+ -0.94,0.570 -0.12,0.198 -1.26,0.531* 0.01,0.195
age 2012(2)-1992(2) -2.31,0.475** -0.31,0.164+ -1.07,0.568+ -0.22,0.200 -1.27,0.527* 0.00,0.185
tenure 2012-1992
-0.25,0.342 -0.04,0.123 -0.56,0.430 -0.21,0.150 -0.61,0.443 -0.06,0.163
Note  The age effects are estimated in regression models for all employees within class and year, and with complete 
controls (see text).
 The tenure variable is a dummy that takes value 1 when the individual’s tenure is above the median in the given 
year. 
 + significant at the 10 % level; * significant at the 5 % level; ** significant at the 1 per cent level.
 F(1), F(2) refer to the model F-statistics for, respectively, the specification with and the specification without the 
tenure variable.
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Table 5. Age effects by class within year for models with(1)  and without (2) tenure variable
class> managers and professionals intermediate semi-routine and routine
outcome > OC OJS OC OJS OC OJS
1992(1) b, s.e. 1.77,0.391** 0.25,0.123* 0.73,0.372+ 0.18,0.137 0.85,0.382* 0.18,0.119
1992(2) b,s.e. 1.86,0.375** 0.26,0.117* 0.88,0.367* 0.29,0.144* 0.89,0.377* 0.20,0.118+
tenure 1992 0.46,0.245+ 0.10,0.077 0.66,0.256** 0.28,0.089** 0.20,0.245 0.07,0.081
F(1),F(2) 3.53,3.46 2.20,2.25 2.61,2.57 2.65,2.33 3.72,3.93 3.26,3.36
2006(1),b,s.e. -0.16,0.213 -0.03,0.082 -0.01,0.264 0.11,0.093 0.11,0.269 0.23,0.094*
2006(2),b,s.e. -0.04,0.212 -0.01,0.078 -0.03,0.262 0.14,0.093 0.17,0.264 0.26,0.096**
tenure 2006 0.43,0.175* 0.07,0.063 -0.03,0.211 0.09,0.076 0.29,0.212 0.20,0.084*
F(1),F(2) 3.95,3.74 2.10,2.11 2.62,2.65 2.44,2.57 3.58,3.70 4.11,4.21
2012(1),b,s.e. -0.58,0.293* -0.06,0.117 -0.21,0.432 0.06,0.143 -0.41,0.369 0.19,0.154
2012(2),b,s.e. -0.54,0.291+ -0.05,0.115 -0.19,0.433 0.07,0.139 -0.38,0.368 0.20,0.143
F(1),F(2) 2.87,3.04 1.49,1.54 1.39,1.43 2.21,2.27 2.36,2.46 2.04,2.13
tenure 2012 0.21,0.239 0.06,0.096 0.10,0.345 0.07,0.121 -0.41,0.369 0.01,0.141
2012(1)-1992(1) -2.35,0.489** -0.31,0.170+ -0.94,0.570 -0.12,0.198 -1.26,0.531* 0.01,0.195
2012(2)-1992(2) -2.31,0.475** -0.31,0.164+ -1.07,0.568+ -0.22,0.200 -1.27,0.527* 0.00,0.185
tenure 2012-1992
-0.25,0.342 -0.04,0.123 -0.56,0.430 -0.21,0.150 -0.61,0.443 -0.06,0.163
Note 1: The age effects are estimated in models with pooled data for all employees within class and year.
Note 2: The tenure variable is a dummy that takes value 1 when the individual’s tenure is above the median in the 
given year.  For the use of a median split as a way of purging error in a regressor variable, see Wald (1940).
Note 3: + significant at the 10 % level; * significant at the 5 % level; ** significant at the 1 per cent level.
Note 4: F(1), F(2) refer to the model F-statistics for, respectively, the specification with and the specification 
without the tenure variable
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